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PREVENTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST INMATES
WHO HAVE BEEN SEXUALLY ASSAULTED BY
SHOWING THAT THE RISK WAS OBVIOUS
BRIAN SACCENTI*
One man who was raped in prison asked, "Am I not a human
being because I'm a convicted felon? I ask society as a whole. Am I so
bad that I deserve such cruel and indescribable pain? That I will live
with for the rest of my life?"' The Eighth Amendment reaffirms that
incarcerated persons remain part of human society and, for that rea-
son, cannot be subjected to "cruel and unusual punishments."2 The
Supreme Court has recognized that "[b]eing violently assaulted in
prison is simply not 'part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society."' 3  Nevertheless, thousands upon
thousands of inmates are sexually assaulted every year.4
* B.A. 1995, Mount St. Mary's College, J.D. 2000, University of Maryland School of
Law. The author thanks Surrell Brady, Associate Profesor of Law, for her helpful critiques
of preliminary drafts of this Comment.
1. Greg Burton, Prison Rapes Covered Up, Inmates Say, Salt Lake Trib., Nov. 9, 1997, at
BI (quoting a letter from an inmate who was a victim of rape).
2. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII (providing that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted"); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion) (observing that "[t]he basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man").
3. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
4. This Comment focuses on the rape of male inmates by other inmates in United
States prisons. It concentrates on rape, as opposed to other forms of violence, for three
reasons. First, sexual assault is uniquely destructive of human dignity, a core concern of
the Eighth Amendment and of any civilized society. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,
542 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) (describing rape as the "ultimate violation of self" short
of homicide) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
597 (1977) (plurality opinion)). Second, the Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on
prison officials to minimize the risk of "serious harm," and rape, as opposed to some physi-
cal assaults, is per se "serious harm." See id.; see also Richard D. Vetstein, Note, Rape and AIDS
in Prison: On a Collision Course to a New Death Penalty, 30 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 863, 865 (1997)
(observing that "many inmates face an unintended form of capital punishment, a brutal
attack by another prisoner and subsequent infection with a terminal and incurable dis-
ease"). Third, the author regards this Comment as an opportunity to shed some light on
the "most closely guarded secret activity of American prisons." CARL WEISS & DAVID JAMES
FRIAR, TERROR IN THE PRISONS X (1974).
This Comment deals primarily with attacks on male inmates because women are less
likely to be sexually assaulted by other inmates. See LEE H. BOWKER, PRISON VICTIMIZATION
49 (1980) (citing studies from the 1960s and 1970s). Furthermore, it does not address the
important related problem of guards or other prison officials sexually assaulting inmates.
For discussions regarding this problem, see Ashley E. Day, Comment, Cruel and Unusual
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A significant hurdle for inmates who seek relief from the courts
occurs at the pretrial stage, when the defendant-officials often move
for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff-inmate cannot
prove that prison officials actually knew of and disregarded the risk
that they would by raped.5 Courts frequently grant the officials' mo-
tions for summary judgment,6 in spite of conditions at the institution
that would make the risk of rape obvious to a reasonable person in the
official's position.
This Comment proposes that courts should not grant officials'
motions for summary judgment on the ground that the inmate-
plaintiff has not shown that the officials knew of the risk, if the plain-
tiff has shown the existence of conditions at the institution that would
make obvious the existence of a substantial risk of sexual assault. This
approach would be more faithful to recent Supreme Court law on
prison conditions and the established law on summary judgment.
More importantly, it would induce prison officials that want to avoid
liability for inmate assaults to take the steps necessary to create a rea-
sonably safe prison environment.
Part I of this Comment examines the problem of sexual assault in
this nation's prisons and jails, including the institutional conditions
that facilitate its occurrence and its effects on inmates. Part II dis-
cusses the Supreme Court's holding that plaintiff-inmates must show
that defendant-officials acted with "deliberate indifference," and how
lower courts have applied and misapplied this holding in deciding
whether the plaintiffs have adduced sufficient evidence of the offi-
cial's "actual knowledge" of the risk to survive a motion for summary
judgment. Part III concludes that lower courts should not grant sum-
mary judgment to defendant-officials if the plaintiff-inmate has shown
Punishment of Female Inmates: The Need for Redress Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 555 (1998); Amy Laderberg, Note, The "Dirty Little Secret": Why Class Actions Have
Emerged as the Only Viable Option for Women Inmates Attempting to Satisfy the Subjective Prong of
the Eighth Amendment in Suits for Custodial Sexual Abuse, 40 WM. & MARY L. RFv. 323 (1998).
5. Cf The Jailhouse Lawyer's Manual: How to Bring a Federal Suit Against Abuses in
Prison 24 (rev. 1982) (noting that "the prison officials probably will submit a motion for a
summary judgment"); JIM THOMAS, PRISONER LITIGATION: THE PARADOX OF THE JAILHOUSE
LAWYER 174 (1988) (stating that the government usually files a motion to dismiss and/or a
motion for summary judgment).
6. See, e.g., Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1584-85 (l1th Cir. 1995) (af-
firming the district court's grant of summary judgment for one defendant and reversing
the summary judgment for the other defendant where the two jailors had been accused of
deliberate indifference towards the great risk of violence present in their jail); Webb v.
Lawrence County, 950 F. Supp. 960, 964-65 (D.S.D. 1996) (granting the official's claim for
summary judgment against the plaintiff prisoner), affd, 144 F.3d 1131 (8th Cir. 1998).
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that the risk of assault was obvious and considers ways that an inmate
could make this showing.
I. SEXUAL ASSAULT IN PRISONS AND JAILS
A. The Incidence and Effect of Rape in United States Prisons and Jails
It is estimated that more than 350,000 men are sexually assaulted
every year in our nation's prisons and jails.7 One prison official ob-
7. See Stephen Donaldson, Prisoner Rape Education Program: Overview for Jail/
Prison Administrators and Staff 10 (1993) (Brandon, VT: The Safer Society Press) (esti-
mating that more than 100,000 persons in prison and more than 250,000 persons in jails
are sexually victimized every year). It is difficult, however, to gauge the number of rapes
that occur in prison because the subject is shrouded in silence. See Robert W. Dumond,
The Sexual Assault of Male Inmates in Incarcerated Settings, 20 Int'l J. of the Sociology of Law
135, 135-36 (1992) (asserting that conclusive data on the prevalence of sexual assaults in
prisons are unavailable because of a lack of research). Inmates themselves are unlikely to
report the crime because of the stigma of being raped, see H.M. Eigenberg, Rape in Male
Prisons: Examining the Relationship Between Correctional Officers'Attitudes Toward Male Rape and
their Willingness to Respond to Acts of Rape 147 (1994), in PRISON VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 145-65
(M.C. Braswell et al., 2d ed. 1994) (opining that inmates underreport rape, even to re-
searchers, because of the stigma of being raped and of reporting rape), and because of the
risk of retaliation by other inmates, see United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 426 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "[f]iling a complaint may well result in retri-
bution, and appealing to the guards is a capital offense under the prisoners' code of behav-
ior" (citing R. GOLDFARB, JAILS: THE ULTIMATE GHETTO 325-326 (1975) (recounting
Oklahoma Crime Commission officials' description of gang rape and conclusion that "[if
the kid tells the guards] . . . his life isn't worth a nickel" (alteration in original)); Missouri
v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Mo. 1971) (dissenting opinion));Jason D. Sanabria, Note
& Comment, Farmer v. Brennan: Do Prisoners Have Any Rights Left Under the Eighth Amend-
ment?, 16 WHITTIER L. REv. 1113, 1114 n.9 (1995) (noting that "[t]he retribution often
amounts to gruesome attacks with torches, impaling with metal pipes, decapitations, castra-
tion, and eviscerations, to name but a few" (citingJames G. Robertson, The Constitution in
Protective Custody: An Analysis of the Rights of Protective Custody Inmates, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 91,
102 n.56 (1987))). Furthermore, prison officials are unlikely to record the crime. See Ruiz
v.Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 917 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (noting that "[n]o attempt is made to
monitor the total number of reported sexual assaults in . . . [the Texas Department of
Correctional Justice], and the result is that differing accounts are extant concerning the
total number of sexual assaults throughout the prison units" (citation omitted)); Emily
Wilkerson, Inmate Letters Keep Legislator Fighting: Rapes, Assaults Give Him Cause to Push for
Changes, STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER (SPRINGFIELD, ILL.), Dec. 14, 1996, at 10 [1996 WL
13476326] (reporting that the Illinois Department of Corrections only recently began re-
cording reports of prison rapes separate from reports of other assaults).
Researchers have also largely ignored the subject of prison rape. See Cindy Struckman-
Johnson et al., Sexual Coercion Reported by Men and Women in Prison, 33J. SEX RESEARCH 67,
67 (1996) (noting that the "absence of research is conspicuous in the social sciences and
sexology" in light of the hundreds of studies on sexual coercion in community settings and
finding that chapters on sexual coercion in ten human sexuality textbooks published in
the early 1990s averaged only two paragraphs on inmate victims); Dumond, supra, at 136
(finding fewer than a dozen studies on inmate sexual assault in U.S. prisons). Nobody
wants to talk about it. SeeJ.F. FISHMAN, SEX IN PRISON: REVEALING SEX CONDITIONS IN AMER-
ICAN PRISONS 5 (1934) (observing in 1934 that "[w]e are living in a frank and realistic age,
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served that it is "almost standard" for a young inmate to "get raped
within the first twenty-four to forty-eight hours."' Because male rape
is an uncomfortable subject for many people, and because most peo-
ple have little sympathy for the plight of convicted criminals, few peo-
ple hear about what happens to these men. This Comment suggests
strategies to help prisoners survive motions to dismiss and/or for sum-
mary judgment so that they can tell their stories to ajury. But first, it
is important to recount a few of their stories here. One victim
recounted:
yet the subject of sex in prison-so provocative, so vital, so timely, .. . is shrouded in dread
silence"), quoted in Struckman-Johnson et al., supra, at 67 (observing that "[t]he silence has
largely prevailed throughout the century").
Despite these problems, there have been a few studies of prison rape, and it is possible
to get a rough idea of the scope of the problem nationwide. A recent study of the Ne-
braska prison system found that 22% of male prisoners who responded to a survey re-
ported that they were pressured or forced to have sexual contact. See Struckman-Johnson
et al., supra, at 71. Those who had been targeted have reported an average of nine epi-
sodes of pressured or forced sex by an average of four different persons. See id. Asked to
identify the most severe sexual act that occurred during their "worst case" incident-the
incident that was the most harmful or serious-52% of those targeted (or more than 10%
of those who responded to the survey) indicated that they had been pressured or forced to
engage in acts that included anal sex. See id. Eight percent said that the most severe sexual
act that they had been pressured or forced to engage in was oral sex. See id.
Other studies have found lower percentages of prisoners who had been raped. See id.
at 68. In a study conducted during the 1960s, one researcher estimated that approximately
3% of men in Philadelphia jails were sexually assaulted every year. See A.J. Davis, Sexual
Assaults in the Philadelphia Prison System and Sheriffs Vans, in MALE RAPE: A CASEBOOK OF
SEXUAL AGGRESSIONS 107-120 (A.M. Scacco, Jr., ed., 1982). Two-thirds of the reported inci-
dents involved completed rapes. See id. In the 1980s, a researcher found that although
28% of 89 inmates interviewed at a New York state prison had been targets of sexual ag-
gression, only one inmate (1.3%) said that he had been raped. See D. Lockwood, Issues in
Prison Sexual Violence 98, in PRISON VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 97-102 (M.C. Braswell et al., eds.,
2d ed. 1994); D. LOCKWOOD, PRISON SEXUAL VIOLENCE 17-18 (1980). Another pair of re-
searchers estimated that 2% of inmates in federal prisons had someone force or attempt to
force them to have sex against their will, with only 0.3% of those sampled reporting a
completed rape. See Peter L. Nacci & T. Kane, The Incidence of Sex and Sexual Aggression in
Federal Prisons, 47 FEDERAL PROBATION 31, 35 (1983). Researchers have suggested that these
studies may underestimate the actual incidence of sexual assault in prisons and jails. See
Eigenberg, supra, at 147 (opining that the stigma of being raped and the fear of being
labeled a "snitch" causes inmates to underreport sexual assault to researchers); Struckman-
Johnson et al., supra, at 68 (noting that "[m]ost prior research on sexual coercion in pris-
ons is based upon personal interviews, a method that can easily result in underreporting
this sensitive behavior"). In the only other comprehensive survey, see Struckman-Johnson
et al., supra, at 68 (indicating that this is the only other comprehensive survey), 14% of a
randomly selected sample of 200 inmates at a medium security prison in California re-
ported, in an anonymous survey, that they had been pressured into having sex against their
will. See W.S. WOODEN &J. PARKER, MEN BEHIND BARS: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN PRISON 18
(1982).
8. James Gilligan, Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and Its Causes 174 (1996) (cita-
tion omitted).
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All of a sudden a coat was thrown over my face and
when I tried to pull it off I was viciously punched in the face
for around ten minutes. I fell to the floor and they kicked
me all over my body, including my head and my privates.
They ripped my pants from me and five or six of them held
me down and took turns fucking me.
My insides feel sore and my body hurts, my head hurts,
and I feel sick in the stomach. Each time they stopped I
tried to call for help, but they put my hands over my mouth
so that I couldn't make a sound. While they held me, they
burned my leg with a cigarette. 9
Another inmate described the effects of the harassment and assaults
suffered by a fellow prisoner:
He couldn't take care of himself, you know. He wasn't a
con, he wasn't a tough guy. He was just that kind of human
being and, like, terrified, and the fucking guys just took ad-
vantage of him, you know. . . . I don't know how many
fucked him, but like, there were others that were involved
that were just harassing him .... The kid went to Mattawan,
because I remember the day that he wrapped shit in rags and
toilet paper and stuffed it under his bed, and, like, before
they sent him to Bellevue they had him clean it up-the
hacks had him clean it out, and he wound up in the bug-
house. He wound up in the bughouse.10
Here, an inmate describes how other inmates attacked him and his
cellmate, as well as the reaction of the guard who found them
afterwards:
I'm a 28 yr. old black male.... I was place in the max.
joint and put in a cell with another young kid he was
white.... About a month after being in the joint i came
back to my cell .... I walk in my cell and it was full with
black guys and my cellie was on his knees sucking them off. I
should of got the fuck out of there but i didn't. The next
thing I knew I was hit in the face by someone when i turn to
run I was grab by the back and they started beatting the crap
out of me. Then i was told to strip which i did and they
threw me on the bed and someone got on top of me and
ram his dick in me i scream from the pain of it what a fucken
mistake i ended up getting my face pound in for it.... They
9. Bowker, supra note 4, at 4 (quoting Alan J. Davis, Sexual Assaults in the Philadelphia
Prison System and Sheriffs Vans, Trans-Action 12 (Dec. 1968)).
10. Id. at 4 (alteration in original) (quoting A. Astrachan, Profile/Louisiana, Corrections
Magazine 2 (Sept.-Oct. 1975)).
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kept beatting the crap out of me .... Well then someone
ram him dick in my mouth and i choke on it but they didn't
care.... [One by one they either fuck me in the ass or ram
there cock down my throat or both. Than one of them de-
cide to piss in my mouth and told me i better drink it or else
so i did.... I lost count of who was doing what. Then when
i thought it was over they started in on my cellie beatting the
crap out of him too.... Then i pass out and when i came to
they was gone. I couldn't mo [v]e but i was on the floor in
my cell next to my cellie. He was crying .... We just ball up
together holding each other. I . . .stay like that til the of-
ficer's did count.... I told him we need to go to the hospital
he said what the fuck you say faggot I told him again and i
said we was rape. He started laughing saying yea right. Hell
there was blood all over us and the cell but this cop thinks
i'm lieing. 11
These examples are important because the statistics alone cannot con-
vey the horror that victims experience in our nation's prisons. 12 Yet
the statistics take on a new and horrible meaning when they are con-
sidered in light of these accounts. Three hundred fifty thousand as-
saults a year mean that nearly one thousand men a day are subjected
to the terror and degradation described above. Each victim has his
own story.
The effect of rape on prisoners is a profoundly devastating and
degrading experience. Six Supreme Court justices have authored or
joined opinions that referred to rape as the "ultimate violation of self'
short of homicide.1 3 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit acknowledged that "[r] ape constitutes an intrusion upon
areas of the victim's life, both physical and psychological, to which our
society attaches the deepest sense of privacy."14 The words of men
who have been raped in prison evidence the humiliation felt by the
victims. Years after he was raped, one man said:
11. Stephen Donaldson, Excerpts from Typical Prisoners' Letters on Rape (visited Nov. 11,
1999) <http://www.igc.apc.org/spr/docs/prison-letters.html>.
12. Cf Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1391 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (mem.) (recognizing
that "it is impossible for a written opinion to convey . . .the gruesome experiences of
youthful first offenders forcibly raped"), modified, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam); Bowker, supra note 4, at 4 (noting that "[n]o analytic description can ever hope to
portray prison rapes with such vividness that readers can understand the true impact of
being a victim in a prison sexual assault").
13. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (White J., dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
14. United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 1977).
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They took something away from me that I can never replace.
I've tried so many nights to forget about it, but the feeling
just doesn't go away. Every time I'm with my wife, it comes
back what he did to me. I want a close to the story. I want
some salvation. But it keeps going on and on. 15
In addition to the emotional pain, a victim endures the physical agony
of the rape itself as well as the beatings that frequently accompany the
sexual assault. 16 Worse still, rape can be a death sentence for inmates
in the age of AIDS.1 7 Even those who are lucky enough to avoid sex-
ual assault live in almost constant fear of it.'" Ironically, the inmates
least harmed by the prevalence of prison rape are likely to be those
that society regards as the worst: the most hardened offenders and
the rapists themselves.19
B. Conditions That Place Inmates at Risk
Courts and commentators have identified the following condi-
tions as placing inmates at risk for being sexually assaulted:
facility overcrowding; inadequate facility staffing; inadequate
supervision of prisoners and staff; inadequate classification
system to separate violent prisoners from vulnerable prison-
ers; inadequate systems for reporting and tracking violent in-
cidents; failure to train staff to respond to and to investigate
violent incidents; placement of some prisoners in positions
of supervisory authority over others; overreliance on open
15. Mark Arax & Mark Gladstone, 5 Charged in Corcoran Prison Rape Inquiry: Guards
Indicted on Accusations of Allowing Attack on Inmate by a Known Sexual Predator, L.A. Times,
Oct. 9, 1998, at Al (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting victim of a prison rape).
This prisoner is not alone. A study of the emotional consequences of sexual victimization
indicated that the impact on inmates was "extremely negative." See Struckman-Johnson et
al., supra note 7, at 73. The most frequently reported problems experienced by male in-
mates were distrust, nervousness around people, and depression. See id.
16. Cf Vetstein, supra note 4, at 870 (recounting an inmate's experience of being tied
to his bed, his head banged against the bed's steel bars, and then raped for thirty minutes).
17. See id. at 865.
18. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1391 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (mem.) (referring to
"the cruel and justifiable fears of inmates, wondering when they will be called upon to
defend the next violent assault"), modified, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); see
a/soJames E. Robertson, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in United States Prisons: Sexual Harass-
ment Among Male Inmates, 36 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 29-31 (1999) (discussing the inmates'
continual fear of "sexual victimization").
19. Cf Charles Fried, Reflections on Crime and Punishment, 30 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 681, 682
(1997) (discussing "the widespread regime of intimidation by stronger, organized inmates
against the weaker or less experienced inmates" (footnote omitted)); Vetstein, supra note
4, at 871 (noting that victims of prison rape are usually young with minimal criminal
records).
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dormitory housing; and failure to control tools or other ma-
terial that can be used as weapons.2z
Overcrowding is a pervasive problem in prisons. On December
31, 1998, state prisons were operating at between thirteen percent and
twenty-two percent above capacity, and federal prisons were operating
at twenty-seven percent above capacity.21 California, the state with the
highest number of people in prison,2 2 was operating at more than
twice its capacity. 23 Overcrowded "facilities lack the space and the
staff to protect vulnerable inmates from predatory ones. "24
Inadequate supervision increases the risk of rape because it leads
to conditions in which guards will be less likely to stop a sexual assault
in progress and will be unable to identify offenders without the coop-
eration of victims who fear retribution. In some institutions, for in-
stance, guards patrol the holding areas at regular intervals.2 5 An
official at a jail where guards made rounds every hour admitted that
this routine was not much of a safeguard, explaining that "[a] lot can
happen in an hour."2 6
Housing more than one inmate together obviously increases the
risk that sexual assaults will occur by permitting inmates access to each
other in close quarters.27 Although the Supreme Court has held that
double-celling is not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment,2 8 it
is a condition of confinement that courts should consider in deter-
mining whether the risk of rape is obvious. The problems inherent in
20. Marjorie Rifkin, Farmer v. Brennan: Spotlight on an Obvious Risk of Rape in a Hidden
World, 26 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 273, 278-79 (1995) (citing Fisherv. Koehler, 692 F. Supp.
1519, 1561-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);JOHN BOSTON & DANIEL E. MANVILLE, PRISONERS' SELF-HELP
LITIGATION MANUAL 21-125 (3d ed. 1995)).
21. See Allen J. Beck & Christopher J. Mumola, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin,
Prisoners in 1998, at 1 (1999).
22. See id. at 5 (reporting that California had 161,904 persons in its prisons at the end
of 1998).
23. See id. at 8 (reporting that California was operating at 203% of its capacity at the
end of 1998).
24. See Amnesty International: U.S.A. Campaign, Rights for All 2 [available at http://
www.rightsforall-usa.org/info/report/r04.htm (referring to text proceeding n.8 in
report) ].
25. SeeJ.D. Gallop, Inmate Rapes Persist Despite Jail's Efforts to Prevent Them, Florida Today,
Apr. 19, 1998, at IB (describing the procedure at one Florida jail).
26. Id.
27. See All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 16, 1997) (citing the spokesman
for the Illinois Department of Corrections as saying that single-ceiling inmates would re-
duce the risk of rape in prison); Gallop, supra note 25, at lB (citing jail officials as explain-
ing that assaults often occur at night after lockdown when inmates are in their cells and
out of view).
28. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-48 & n.15 (1981) (noting evidence that
double ceiling did not necessarily increase violence among inmates).
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double-ceiling naturally increase when overcrowding at the institution
results in officials packing three, four, or more people in a single cell,
when the supervision by guards is inadequate, or when the institution
does not take steps to identify and separate inmates who would be
likely to sexually assault cellmates from likely victims.
Courts have also recognized the risk to inmates in open dormito-
ries. In Gates v. Collier,29 the district court observed that the penolo-
gists who testified on the matter were "in complete accord . .. that
open dormitory housing, particularly with bathroom and shower areas
beyond the watchful eye of correctional guards, present[s] special
danger of serious inmate assaults from other inmates, as well as to
staff."3 ° This danger naturally increases when accompanied by other
conditions such as inadequate supervision, availability of weapons,3
and overcrowding.
The failure of penal institutions to investigate and prosecute re-
ported rapes also increases the risk to inmates. One court cogently
observed that "[t]he lack of such [investigative] procedures created
an atmosphere of tolerance of rape which enhanced the risk that inci-
dents could occur. ' 32 The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the
conditions at a prison can create an atmosphere that facilitates rapes.
In LaMarca v. Turner,3 the court concluded that
the evidence shows a link between the unconstitutional con-
ditions and the plaintiffs' injuries. The record supports the
district court's finding "that due to [their] very nature as acts
of violence, the rapes that occurred are not isolated inci-
dents of sexual conduct, but rather flow directly from the
lawless prison conditions at GCI .... [These conditions cre-
ated] the background and climate which . . . preordained
homosexual rapes and other inmate assault[s]." The evi-
dence thus permits a finding of a causal link between the
objectively intolerable conditions at GCI and the plaintiffs'
injuries.34
29. 423 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
30. Id. at 741.
31. See Smith v. Arkansas Dep't of Correction, 103 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 1996) (discussing
expert opinions that open barracks at a certain prison posed a danger to inmates); Smith v.
Norris, 877 F. Supp. 1296, 1311-13 (E.D. Ark. 1995) (discussing the danger posed by per-
mitting prisoners to keep hobby tools in open barracks), affd in part and rev'd in part sub
nom. Smith v. Arkansas Dep't of Correction, 103 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 1996).
32. LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1533 (lth Cir. 1993).
33. 995 F.2d 1526 (lth Cir. 1993).
34. Id. at 1539 (alteration in original) (quoting LaMarca v. Turner, 662 F. Supp. 647,
687 (S.D. Fla. 1987)). "GCI" is the abbreviation for the Glades Correctional Institute, a
Florida prison. See id. at 1530.
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II. JUDICIAL RELIEF AND THE STANDARD OF ACTIONABILITY
A. The Supreme Court's Explanation of the 'Deliberate
Indifference" Standard
It is now settled that the Eighth Amendment places limits on the
treatment that a inmate receives and on the conditions of the prison
or jail in which he is confined.3" This amendment places a duty on
prison officials to "take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of
the inmates."3 6 Specifically, "prison officials have a duty... to protect
prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.""v The Su-
preme Court has said that
[p]rison conditions may be "restrictive and even harsh," but
gratuitously allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by
another serves "no legitimate penological objectiv[e]," any
more than it squares with "evolving standards of decency."
Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not "part of the
penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society."8
Noting that the Eighth Amendment outlaws cruel and unusual
"punishments," not cruel and unusual "conditions,"3 9 the Court has
required that officials know of the risk before liability may be im-
posed, reasoning that "prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk
cannot be said to have inflicted punishment."4  Specifically, the
Court, beginning with the cases of Estelle v. Gamble4 t and Wilson v.
Seiter,4 2 has made clear that a prison official's failure to prevent harm
resulting from prison conditions violates the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment only if the prison official
showed "deliberate indifference" to the risk.4"
35. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). Although a pretrial detainee's rights
arise from the Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment, courts often ana-
lyze a detainee's claims regarding conditions of confinement under the Eighth Amend-
ment, reasoning that the Due Process Clause gives detainees at least as much protection as
the Eighth Amendment gives convicted prisoners. See Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d
1579, 1582 n.4 (1995) (citations omitted).
36. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)).
37. Id. at 833 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting
Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988)).
38. Id. at 833-34 (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original)
(internal citations omitted).
39. See id. at 837 (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. &d at 844.
41. 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
42. 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).
43. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
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The Supreme Court explained the "deliberate indifference" stan-
dard in a failure-to-protect case involving prison rape. In Farmer v.
Brennan,4 a transsexual45 prisoner sued prison officials after they
placed her46 in the general population of a male prison where she was
allegedly raped and beaten by another prisoner. Dee Farmer's
amended complaint alleged that the officials placed her in the gen-
eral population despite knowing that the prison was a violent place
with a history of inmate assaults and that she, as a transsexual, would
be particularly vulnerable to sexual assault by male inmates. 4s Farmer
asserted that this was tantamount to a deliberately indifferent failure
to protect her safety.49
The district court granted summary judgment to the prison offi-
cials.5° The court held that the failure of prison officials to prevent
inmate assaults violated the Eighth Amendment only if the officials
had "actual knowledge" of a potential danger, and concluded that the
officials lacked the requisite knowledge because Farmer had not told
them that she was concerned for her safety.5"
After the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit summarily af-
firmed the judgment, the Supreme Court granted certiorari52 to re-
solve a split among the circuits over whether the "deliberate
indifference" standard required that prison officials actually know of
the risk, or whether it only required that prison officials should have
known of the risk.53 The Court held that "deliberate indifference"
44. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
45. A transsexual is someone who has "'[a] rare psychiatric disorder in which a person
feels persistently uncomfortable about his or her anatomical sex,' and who typically seeks
medical treatment, including hormonal therapy and surgery, to bring about a permanent
sex change." Id. at 829 (alteration in original) (quoting American Medical Association,
Encyclopedia of Medicine 1006 (1989)).
46. Dee Farmer, who was born anatomically male, wore women's clothing, received
silicone breast implants, underwent estrogen therapy and had an unsuccessful "black mar-
ket" testicle-removal surgery. Id. at 829 (internal quotation marks omitted). The parties
agreed that Farmer "project[ed] feminine characteristics." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court carefully avoided referring to Farmer's
gender in its opinion. See Rifkin, supra note 20, at 273 n.I. Due to her transsexual status
and in accordance with her preference, see id., this Comment will refer to her using femi-
nine pronouns.
47. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 830.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 831.
51. Id. at 831-32.
52. Farmer v. Brennan, 11 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 510 U.S. 811 (1993).
53. See 511 U.S. at 832. In particular, the Court noted the clear inconsistencies be-
tween the holding in McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 348 (7th Cir. 1991), that "deliber-
ate indifference" requires a subjective standard of recklessness, and the holding in Young v.
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entails actual knowledge of the risk, reasoning that subjecting a pris-
oner to a risk was only "punishment" within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment if the officials actually knew that they were expos-
ing the prisoner to the risk.54 After Farmer, prison conditions violate
the Eighth Amendment if they (1) create a substantial risk of serious
harm, 55 (2) a prison official actually knows of the risk, 56 and (3) the
official fails to respond reasonably to the risk.57
The Farmer Court also made clear that a prisoner need not show
that the official believed that the complainant would actually be
harmed, but only that the official actually knew of a substantial risk of
serious harm. 5' The Court warned prison officials that they could not
escape liability by showing that although they knew of such a risk, they
did not know that the complainant was especially likely to be assaulted
by the specific prisoner who eventually attacked him.5 ' The Court
stated that "it does not matter whether the risk comes from a single
source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a pris-
oner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or
because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk."6 ° The Court
further explained that
[i]f, for example, prison officials were aware that inmate
"rape was so common and uncontrolled that some potential
victims dared not sleep [but] instead . . .would leave their
beds and spend the nights clinging to the bars nearest the
guards' station," it would obviously be irrelevant to liability
Quintan, 960 F.2d 351, 360-61 (3d Cir. 1992), that "deliberate indifference" requires that
the prison official have known or should have known of a sufficiently serious danger to an
inmate. The Farmer Court also framed the issue as whether the level of culpability required
by "deliberate indifference" is that of civil law recklessness (objective standard) or criminal
law recklessness (subjective standard). Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37.
54. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
55. See id. at 834.
56. See id. at 837.
57. See id. Compare 511 U.S. at 834 (noting that a prison official is liable only if he is
deliberately indifferent to the inmate's health or safety), with id. at 837-38 (defining "delib-
erate indifference" as requiring that official actually knew of the risk), and id. at 844 (hold-
ing that "prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to the inmate's health or
safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk").
58. Id. at 843 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993), for proposition that
"the Eighth Amendment requires a remedy for exposure of inmates to 'infectious mala-
dies' such as hepatitis and venereal disease 'even though the possible infection might not
affect all of those exposed"').
59. Id.
60. Id.
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that the officials could not guess beforehand precisely who
would attack whom. 6
The Court made it equally clear that "a factfinder may conclude
that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that
the risk was obvious. ' 6 2 The Court stressed that the obviousness of a
risk, though not conclusive, was circumstantial evidence that the
prison officials had the requisite knowledge: 63
For example, if an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents evi-
dence showing that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was
"longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly
noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances
suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been ex-
posed to information concerning the risk and thus 'must
have known' about it, then such evidence could be sufficient
to permit a trier of fact to find that the defendant-official
had actual knowledge of the risk."64
The Court also emphasized that prison officials cannot escape liability
by shutting their eyes to the obvious by "merely refus[ing] to verify
underlying facts that he strongly suspect [s] to be true, or declin[ing]
to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly suspect[s] to exist."65
Despite the Court's adoption of the stricter actual knowledge re-
quirement, Farmer actually relaxed the knowledge requirement previ-
ously adopted by some circuits. For instance, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit had adopted a very specific knowledge require-
ment. In Ruefly v. Landon,66 the Fourth Circuit held that "deliberate
indifference" required a showing that prison officials knew of a spe-
cific risk to a specific prisoner.67 The court held that officials were not
liable for assigning an inmate to share a cell with an inmate who they
61. Id. at 843-44 (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citations omitted) (quot-
ing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681-82 n.3 (1978)) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.
25, 33 (1993); Massachusetts v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 912 (Mass. 1944); West Virginia v.
Julius, 408 S.E.2d 1, 10-11 (W. Va. 1991)).
62. Id. at 842.
63. Id. at 843 n.8.
64. Id. at 84243 (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 843 n.8. The Court offered the examples of "when a prison official is aware
of a high probability of facts indicating that one prisoner has planned an attack on another
but resists opportunities to obtain final confirmation" and "when a prison official knows
that some diseases are communicable and that a single needle is being used to administer
flu shots to prisoners but refuses to listen to a subordinate who he strongly suspects will
attempt to explain the associated risk of transmitting disease." Id.
66. 825 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1987).
67. Id. at 794. Accord McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.3d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1991) (not-
ing that other circuits had held "that failure to tell prison officials about threats is fatal"
and holding that "[t]hese decisions are sound and require judgment for the defendants").
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knew to be generally violent and dangerous absent a showing that the
inmate posed a specific risk to that plaintiff.6 8 Farmer eased Ruefly's
specific-risk requirement by holding that prison officials could not es-
cape liability merely by showing that they did not know that a specific
inmate posed a risk to the specific plaintiff.
69
B. The Standard for Summary Judgment
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "summary
judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrog-
atories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."'7 0 The Su-
preme Court has explained that trial courts must deny summary judg-
ment if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party."'"
Because a jury can now infer the requisite knowledge "from the
very fact that the risk was obvious,"7 2 Farmer would appear to preclude
a court from granting summary judgment to the prison officials where
there was evidence that a risk of rape was obvious. Not all courts,
however, have seen it this way.
C. The Application of Farmer v. Brennan by Lower Courts to Motions
for Summary Judgment
1. Farmer Misapplied.-Unfortunately, some courts have missed
the implication of Farmer in the summary judgment context. In Webb
v. Lawrence County,7" Douglas Webb brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials after he was sexually assaulted numerous times by his
cellmate. 4 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant-officials on the
ground that the plaintiff-prisoner had failed to establish that officials
actually knew of a substantial risk of harm.7 5 The court concluded
that "[e]ven assuming for purposes of analysis that the risk of sexual
assault faced by young, physically slight inmates like Webb was obvi-
ous, and thus sufficient to put defendants on notice of its existence,
68. Ruefly, 825 F.2d at 793.
69. Wilson v. Wright, 998 F. Supp. 650, 656-57 (E.D. Va. 1998) (citing Price v. Sasser, 65
F.3d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 1995)).
70. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
71. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
72. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994).
73. 144 F.3d 1131 (8th Cir. 1998).
74. Id. at 1134.
75. Id. at 1135.
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Farmer [v. Brennan] specifically rejects the idea that that liability may
be found when a risk is so obvious that it should [have been]
known. 76
The district court's unreported decision in Bolden v. Ramos77 re-
flects a similar misunderstanding of Farmer. The inmate alleged that
prison guards had violated his constitutional rights by failing to pro-
tect him from other inmates.78 Even though the court acknowledged
that Farmer had held "that [actual] knowledge may, where appropri-
ate, be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the obvi-
ousness of the risk,"' 79 the court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, reasoning that "[1] iability does not necessarily fol-
low from an obvious danger; Farmer requires that the danger have
been known."8 ° The court then found that "[t] here is nothing in the
record as to [the guard's] knowledge of this risk or his exposing [the
inmate] to it," and granted summary judgment on the ground that
there was "no genuine dispute as to [the guard's] knowledge of a seri-
ous risk to [the inmate's] safety."8
In Estate of Cole v. Fromm,82 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit specifically rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the obvi-
ousness of the risk to an inmate's health precluded summary judg-
ment for the psychiatrist and nurses who treated him.83 Max Cole had
been transferred to a psychiatric ward after trying to injure himself
and another inmate at the jail.84 Cole's attending physician classified
him as "potentially suicidal," but did not consider him to be at a "high
risk" of suicide, the more severe of the two possible classifications.85
The former is less restrictive than the latter.86 A few days after he was
admitted to the ward, Cole asphyxiated himself with one of the plastic
bags that the hospital used to line linen hampers in the restrooms.87
Cole's mother and estate brought a § 1983 action against the nurses
76. Id. (second and third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quotingJenson v. Clarke, 73 F.3d 808, 811 (8th Cir. 1996)) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at
836).
77. No. 93 C 3416, 1996 WL 66135 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 1996).
78. See id. at *6.
79. Id. at *7 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 1994)).
80. Id. at *8.
81. Id.
82. 94 F.3d 254 (7th Cir. 1996).
83. Id. at 260-61.
84. See id. at 257.
85. Id. at 257-58 (internal quotation marks omitted). The hospital had two levels of
precautions, one for "potentially suicidal" patients and another for "high risk" patients. See
id. at 258.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 258.
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and the psychiatrist who had treated him, alleging that they were de-
liberately indifferent to the danger that he would commit suicide.8
In their opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment, the plaintiffs relied on the affidavit of their expert doctor, in
which he stated that " [t] he danger presented by the plastic bags in the
trash can and the laundry hamper. . . was obvious and significant, and
constituted a substantial risk of serious harm, and significant risk of
death, to a 'potential suicide' patient such as Mr. Cole."89 The court
acknowledged that plastic bags pose a substantial risk to a patient who
intended to commit suicide, but then turned to the question of
whether the defendants were subjectively aware that Cole intended to
commit suicide.9" It concluded that the plaintiffs' expert's assertion
that plastic bags posed an "obvious" risk to "potential suicide" patients
did not support an inference that the nurses and doctor who treated
Cole were subjectively aware that he had intended to kill himself.91
The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' expert "simply disagree[d]"92
with the defendant-psychiatrist, and noted that "[in] ere differences of
opinion among medical personnel regarding a patient's appropriate
treatment do not give rise to deliberate indifference."9 3 It asserted
that a medical professional's error was obvious so as to permit an in-
ference of subjective knowledge of the risk created "only when... [his
or her] decision is such a substantial departure from accepted profes-
sional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the per-
son responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment. 94
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Cole should not be read as fore-
closing the argument that the obviousness of a risk precludes sum-
mary judgment in prison condition cases not involving medical
judgments. The court recognized that
[n] ormally, a jury may infer the subjective (awareness of a
substantial risk) from the objective (obviousness of a risk).
Cases of medical judgment are different. In Estelle [v. Gain-
88. See id. at 257.
89. Id. at 260.
90. Id. at 261.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing White v. Napolean, 897 F.2d 103, 109-10 (3d Cir. 1990)).
94. Id. at 262. It is worth noting that the plaintiffs in Cole did not actually challenge the
attending psychiatrist's diagnosis of Cole as "potentially suicidal," as opposed to "high risk."
Id. at 261. Presumably, the plaintiffs' case would have survived summaryjudgment if they
had submitted evidence that the defendant's diagnosis of Cole was "such a substantial de-
parture from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate
that the person responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment." Id. at 262.
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ble], the Supreme Court recognized the distinction between
a "medical judgment" and deliberate mistreatment. 95
The Seventh Circuit's opinion can be reconciled with Farmer only if it
is read to carve out from the implications of that case a narrow excep-
tion for medical judgments. Its acknowledgement that "[c]ases of
medical judgment are different" certainly supports this reading.96 So
read, Cole does not suggest that courts should award summary judg-
ment to defendants in prison assault cases based on lack of actual
knowledge in the face of an obvious risk. However, its juxtaposition of
medical judgments and deliberate mistreatment is potentially mislead-
ing. The Supreme Court in Farmer held that "a jury may infer the
subjective (awareness of a substantial risk) from the objective (obvi-
ousness of a risk)" in the context of a § 1983 claim based on allega-
tions of unconstitutional conditions of confinement, not just when the
inmate complains of deliberate mistreatment.97
2. The Eleventh Circuit's Cases on State of Mind.-The Eleventh
Circuit is headed in the right direction. In the pre-Farmer case of
LaMarca v. Turner,98 the Eleventh Circuit considered whether there
was sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference to sustain a verdict
against a prison superintendent for failure to protect inmates from
harm.99 Each of the plaintiffs alleged that he had been violently as-
saulted. l ° After a bench trial, the court found the following: (1) in-
mates were housed in dormitories and that the guards' view of many
areas of these dormitories was obstructed; (2) the cells for disciplinary
and protective custody suffered from substandard conditions, were
overcrowded, and did not afford those within protection from their
tormentors; (3) officials did little to control contraband or prevent
inmates from carrying weapons and using drugs; (4) the staff was cor-
rupt, profiting from contraband and using inmates to punish other
prisoners; (5) the staff permitted regular, unsupervised showings of
hard-core pornographic movies, during which the screaming and cry-
ing of inmates could be heard; and (6) the staff did not investigate or
act upon reports of threats or assaults. ° 1
95. Id. at 261.
96. Id.
97. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845.
98. 995 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1993).
99. Id. at 1535.
100. See id. at 1530-33.
101. See id. at 1532-33.
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The court identified several grounds for concluding that the su-
perintendent knew about these conditions. 10 2 One ground was mate-
rial presented by the plaintiffs such as incident reports, internal staff
reports, and reports by outside investigators which mentioned the ex-
istence of lax security, contraband, staff corruption and inmate as-
saults.10 3  The court also noted that the superintendent gained
knowledge of the conditions at the prison through monthly meetings
with staff members, attendance at monthly meetings of each depart-
ment, regular meetings with prisoner organizations, and his practice
of wandering through the prison compound.'0 4 The Eleventh Circuit
held that "[t]he plaintiffs' evidence painted a dark picture of life at
... [the prison]; a picture that would be apparent to any knowledgea-
ble observer, and certainly to an official in ... [the superintendent's]
position."t05 The court noted in a footnote that the superintendent's
"supervisory role and the insular character of prison communities pro-
vided strong support for the [trial] court's conclusion that ... [he]
must have known of these conditions."0 6 The court concluded that
the trier of fact could infer from this evidence that the superintendent
knew the prison failed to provide inmates with reasonable protection
from violence.'0 7
The court also recognized the causal link between the conditions
and the risk of rape at the prison:
[t]he evidence shows a link between the unconstitutional
conditions and the plaintiffs' injuries. The record supports
the district court's finding "that due to [their] very nature as
acts of violence, the rapes that occurred are not isolated inci-
dents of sexual conduct, but rather flow directly from the
lawless prison conditions at [the prison] .... [These condi-
tions created] the background and climate which . . .pre-
ordained homosexual rapes and other inmate assault[s]."
The evidence thus permits a finding of a causal link between
the objectively intolerable conditions at GCI and the plain-
tiffs' injuries.'
102. Id. at 1536 (reiterating that the prison official must possess "knowledge both of the
infirm condition and of the means to cure that condition, 'so that a conscious, culpable
refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendant's failure to prevent it.'"
(quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 673 (7th Cir. 1985))).
103. See id.
104. Id. at 1536 n.20.
105. Id. at 1536.
106. See id. 1536 n.21.
107. See id. at 1536-37 (quoting LaMarca v. Turner, 662 F. Supp. 647, 687 (S.D. Fla.
1987)).
108. Id. at 1539.
659
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The Eleventh Circuit revisited this issue after Farmer in Hale v.
Tallapoosa County.1" 9 While a pretrial detainee at the Tallapoosa
CountyJail, Larry Wayne Hale was beaten by two inmates in a crowded
holding cell.1 1 ° He sued the jailer, the sheriff, and the county, alleg-
ing that they were deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk of in-
mate-on-inmate violence at the jail.11 1 After the district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants, Hale appealed.1 12
On appeal, the court considered whether Hale had produced suf-
ficient evidence against the sheriff and the county.1 1 3 After summariz-
ing the Supreme Court's holding in Farmer, the court found that there
was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the sheriff subjec-
tively knew that a substantial risk of serious harm existed at the jail.1 14
The court pointed to two kinds of evidence as grounds for this
conclusion. First, the court noted that the sheriffs deposition testi-
mony revealed that he knew that violence among inmates occurred on
a regular basis during the month the attack occurred and other peri-
ods of overcrowding and that inmates sometimes required medical
treatment as a result." 5 In addition, the court observed, "Hale's ex-
pert attested that given the conditions existing in the months preced-
ing . . . [the attack], it was plainly foreseeable to a reasonable law
enforcement official that a violent attack was likely to occur." '16 The
Eleventh Circuit's recognition that evidence of certain conditions sup-
ports an inference of actual knowledge so as to preclude a grant of
summary judgment based on that issue is faithful to the Supreme
Court's decision in Farmer and consistent with the purposes of both
summary judgment and the cause of action provided in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
109. 50 F.3d 1579 (11th Cir. 1995).
110. See id. at 1580-81.
111. See id. at 1581.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 1582.
114. See id. at 1583.
115. See id.
116. Id.
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III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THAT OFFiciALs LACKED
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF RISK IS INAPPROPRIATE WHERE RISK
WAS OBVIOUS
A. The Deterrent Purpose of §3 1983 Actions
The primary mechanism for seeking judicial relief'1 7 from prison
conditions is 42 U.S.C. § 1983,118 which codified a cause of action for
constitutional violations. In addition to injunctive relief, § 1983 pro-
vides that aggrieved individuals may recover compensatory and puni-
tive damages from any person who violates their constitutional
rights. 19 A primary purpose of § 1983 is the "deterrence of future
egregious conduct."12 ° In this manner, the money damages available
under § 1983 are similar to punitive damages in tort in that both aim
to encourage compliance with the law.
When courts grant summary judgment to prison officials on the
ground that the plaintiff-inmates have not proven that the officials
had the requisite state of mind, the cases do not make it to trial. As a
result, the adequacy of the officials' efforts to protect inmates is never
placed at issue in the public forum occasioned by a trial. Worse still,
these summary judgments undermine § 1983's potential to encourage
officials to take steps to protect prisoners because they made the ac-
tionability of § 1983 suits turn on the knowledge of the officials rather
than the adequacy of their protective measures. The Supreme Court
117. Although this Comment focuses mainly on the relief available from the judicial
system, it should be noted that legislators have occasionally sought to learn about and have
addressed the problem of prison rape. See, e.g., Brenda Rodriguez, Senate Chairman Calling
for Prison AIDS Hearings, San Antonio Express-News, Sept. 18, 1997, at IA (available at 1997
WL 13205539); Associated Press, Voice Against Assault/Measure to Reduce Prison Rapes Passed,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REc., July 2, 1997, at B2D (available at 1997 WL 4590798); see also
Wilkerson, supra note 7, at 10 (describing the efforts of Illinois State Representative Cal
Skinner in addressing prison rape).
118. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within thejurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
119. Id.
120. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 49 (1983) (citations omitted).
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has said in the context of § 1983 and constitutional rights that "the
conscientious officer who desires clear guidance on how to do his job
and avoid lawsuits can and should look to the standard for actionabil-
ity in the first instance. ' 12 1 it seems unlikely that prison officials
would be as motivated to protect inmates if they knew that they could
avoid liability simply by challenging the inmate's proof that they had
actual knowledge of the risk.' 22
B. Summary Judgment and State of Mind
Even before Farmer clarified the standard, courts had reason to
deny motions for summary judgment based on the issue of the defen-
dant's knowledge. Courts have frequently recognized the need for
caution in granting a motion for summary judgment where a party's
state of mind is at issue.123 The Fifth Circuit has observed that
[t]he court should be cautious in granting a motion for sum-
mary judgment when resolution of the dispositive issue re-
quires a determination of state of mind. . . . In these
circumstances the jury should be given an opportunity to ob-
121. Id. at 50.
122. It would be inappropriate to suggest that prison officials, ostrich-like, stick their
heads in the sand and try to avoid information about the prevalence of sexual assaults if it
were not for evidence that they do exactly that. Prison officials do appear to downplay the
prevalence of prison rape. In Illinois, prison officials told state legislators that the prison
only confirmed 21 sexual assaults over a three year period in a prison system that housed
41,000 inmates in 25 different prisons. See Cornelia Grumman, Prisons Chiefs View of State
Inmate HIV Rate Raises Some Doubts, Chicago Trib., Dec. 5, 1997, at 8; Heather Ryndak,
Prison Cameras Sought, AIDS Measures Opposed, CHICAGO SuN-TIMES, Dec. 5, 1997, at 48. In
Texas, prison documents indicated that there were only six confirmed sexual assaults in
1998, when there were 144,036 people incarcerated in the state's prisons. See Ruiz v.
Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 916, 926 (S.D. Tex. 1999). See generally Brenda Rodriguez,
Rape Contributes to Spread of AIDS: Sexual Assaults in Prisons Rarely Reported, SAN ANTONIO
EXPREss-NEWS, Sept. 15, 1997, at IA (citing studies of sexual assault in prisons). In Utah,
corrections officials told a national accreditation team that no prisoner had been raped
between 1994 and 1996, even though the department's own records showed that dozens of
prisoners reported that they had been sexually assaulted, and one prisoner had actually
been convicted in court of forcible sexual abuse for sodomizing another inmate. See Bur-
ton, supra note 1, at BI. Prison officials may downplay incidents of prison rape to avoid
liability or to avoid admitting that they cannot control the inmates. See id. (citing critics'
theories on why prison officials did not report incidents of rape); see also Ruiz, 37 F. Supp.
2d at 915 (noting that "[t]he lack of protection for inmates by [the Texas Department of
Correctional Justice] . . . evidences a lack of control by prison officials"). Prison officials
may also downplay the problem to deflect criticism by legislators. See Grumman, supra, at 8
(reporting legislator's criticism of prison officials for not doing more to stop prison rape).
123. See 10B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2730, at 5
(1998).
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serve the demeanor, during direct and cross-examination, of
the witnesses whose states of mind are at issue.
1 2 4
The determination of someone's state of mind usually involves the
drawing of inferences "as to which reasonable people might differ."' 25
Because drawing such inferences is a function traditionally left to the
jury, it often will be inappropriate to resolve the issue of a person's
state of mind through summary judgment. 126
Actions based on alleged violations of constitutional rights are
frequently unsuitable for summary judgment because they require an
inquiry into the defendant's state of mind.127 In cases alleging that
prison officials violate a plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights by in-
flicting cruel and unusual punishment, courts have deemed summary
judgment inappropriate because there were questions of fact about
the extent of the defendant's knowledge of the conditions of the
plaintiffs confinement.
128
Farmer made clear that summary judgment is inappropriate when
the risk of rape is obvious. Although a finding that a risk is obvious is
not, by itself, enough to satisfy Farmer's subjective knowledge require-
ment, it is enough to permit the trier of fact to infer that the officials
had actual knowledge. If a trier of fact makes this inference, then this
factual finding is sufficient to satisfy Farmer's subjective knowledge re-
quirement. When a court grants summary judgment for defendant-
officials in spite of an obvious risk, it is effectively making a factual
finding that the obviousness of the risk, in the given case, does not
warrant an inference of actual knowledge. It is simply inappropriate
for a court to decide this factual question on summary judgment.
C. Making the Requisite Showing to Survive Summaiy Judgment
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
[w] hen a motion for summary judgment is made and sup-
ported . . . , an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the
adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise pro-
vided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does
124. Croley v. Matson Navigation Co., 434 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970); see also Wright,
supra note 123, at 5 (quoting Croley).
125. See Wright, supra note 123, at 7.
126. See id.
127. See id. § 2732.2, at 152.
128. See id. at 162-63.
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not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against the adverse party.129
A defendant moving for summary judgment on the knowledge issue
would probably attach an affidavit in which he denies having actual
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. 3 ° The defendants
are obviously in a very good position here. To survive summary judg-
ment, the plaintiffs must show the existence of evidence from which a
reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants actually knew of
the risk."' This is relatively easy where the inmate has actually told
the defendants that other prisoners were threatening him or had at-
tacked him. The inmate can state this fact in the affidavit and that
would probably create a genuine issue of material fact that would pre-
clude summary judgment. 132 Many inmates, however, would not have
complained to prison officials because of the dangers inherent in do-
ing so. 1
31
Prior to Farmer, inmates who did not complain probably would
have been out of luck. After Farmer, however, courts are beginning to
realize that prison officials can have actual knowledge of a substantial
risk based on their knowledge that conditions at a jail or prison are
insufficient to dissuade and to control inmate violence. Lopez v.
LeMaster"' is one such case. Genaro Lopez brought a § 1983 action
against a sheriff for failing to protect him from other inmates.' 35 On
October 1, 1997, Lopez was arrested and placed in a general popula-
tion cell at the Jackson County, Oklahoma, jail.'36 That evening, an-
other inmate struck Lopez with a broom handle, spit on him, and
129. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
130. Cf Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b) (providing that defending party may support motion for
summary judgment with affidavits).
131. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (providing that "the adverse party's response, by affidavits
or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial"). The inmates should also argue that summary judgment is inap-
propriate because there is really no practical way to prove the defendant's state of mind
other than to ask them about their knowledge at trial and permit the fact-finder to evaluate
their credibility. See FED. R. Crv. P. 56(f) (providing that a court may decline to grant
summaryjudgment if it "appear[s] from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that
the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's
opposition").
132. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (providing that summaryjudgment may be entered if there
is no dispute of material fact).
133. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing some of the retaliatory actions
that a prisoner risks in reporting an assault by another inmate).
134. 172 F.3d 756 (10th Cir. 1999).
135. See id. at 758-59.
136. See id. at 758.
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threatened to kill him. 137 Lopez notified the jailer on duty, who took
him to the jailer's office to prepare a written statement. 138 In the of-
fice, Lopez told the jailer that he was afraid to go back into the gen-
eral population cell because he thought the other inmates would
attack him. 139 Thejailer did not respond and returned Lopez to the
cell.14 ° According to Lopez, the jailer was within earshot while the
other inmates were plotting their attack.1 4 ' Five minutes after Lopez
returned to the cell, two cellmates attacked Lopez, one holding his
legs, the other hitting him on the back of his head and neck. 14 2 They
told him they were punishing him for being a "snitch."'4 3 Five min-
utes later, the inmates returned with two more cellmates, and the four
of them again beat and kicked Lopez.' 4 4 About ten minutes later, the
jailer returned and removed Lopez from the cell.145
On appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment
for the defendants, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ob-
served that Lopez was attributing his injuries to two forms of failure to
protect.' 4 6 First, he attributed his injuries to the jailer's placing him
back into the cell after the other inmates had threatened him. 4 7 The
court noted that "[t]his claim challenges an episodic act or omission
of ajail official, rather than a condition, practice, rule or restriction at
the jail."1 4 Specifically, Lopez sought to hold Sheriff LeMaster liable
for his jailer's actions on the basis of poor training and supervision."'
Second, Lopez complained of the jailer's failure to rescue him once
the assaults began. 15' His theory focused "less on the jailer's conduct
than on constitutionally inadequate conditions at the jail which may
have prevented the jailer from acting, such as understaffing, lack of
monitoring equipment or lack of a means by which inmates could
contact guards." '5 1 The court thereby recognized that a failure to
protect action could rest on either (1) "episodic act[s] or omission[s]
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 758-59.
141. See id. at 759.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id
146. Id. at 759-60.
147. See id. at 760.
148. See id. (citing Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 645 (5th Cir. 1996)).
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
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of ajail official," or (2) "constitutionally inadequate conditions" at the
institution that can prevent guards from stopping detainees from as-
saulting other inmates.
The knowledge requirement of these two kinds of failure to pro-
tect actions will be different. Where an action is based on an episodic
act or omission, the inmate will need to show that the official knew
that the act or omission would place the inmate at a substantial risk of
serious harm. However, where the action is based on conditions, the
inmate could support an inference of actual knowledge by showing
that (a) the conditions were obvious and (b) any reasonable official
would have known that they would cause a substantial risk of serious
harm. There could be cases where the conditions at a prison are such
that a substantial risk of serious harm would exist but for a safeguard
taken by prison officials. Where an episodic act or omission has the
effect of removing that safeguard, an inmate may be able to show
knowledge of an obvious risk sufficient to prevent summary judgment
by showing that (a) the conditions at the jail were obvious, (b) any
reasonable official would know that the conditions, absent the safe-
guard, would place inmates at a substantial risk of serious harm, and
(c) the officials knew that the safeguard was being removed.
Where the inmate's theory is that conditions at the institution
place inmates at an obvious risk, he should be able to show that "the
risk was obvious"' 52 by showing (a) that the conditions were obvious
and (b) that any reasonable prison official would have known that the
conditions created a substantial risk of serious harm. The Eleventh
Circuit's opinions in LaMarca and Hale illustrate how a prisoner can
defeat a motion for summary judgment. In LaMarca, the inmates ad-
duced sufficient evidence that the superintendent knew about certain
conditions by producing internal documents mentioning such condi-
tions, and by showing the extent of the superintendent's supervisory
role and interaction with staff and prisoners. 153 The court found that
these supported an inference that he knew about the conditions. 54
In Hale, one way that the inmate established that the conditions made
the risk obvious was by having an expert testify "that given the condi-
tions existing in the months preceding ... [the attack], it was plainly
152. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994).
153. LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1536 (11th Cir. 1993); see also supra notes 102-
107 and accompanying text.
154. See LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1536-37; see also supra notes 105-107 and accompanying
text.
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foreseeable to a reasonable law enforcement official that a violent at-
tack was likely to occur."
1 55
The obviousness of the conditions should be relatively easy to
demonstrate. Conditions like overcrowding, the use of open barracks,
inadequate staff, generally inadequate supervision-conditions that
are "longstanding [and] pervasive" 15 6--would presumably be obvious
to any official with working knowledge of the institution. Neverthe-
less, the fact that the Eleventh Circuit in LaMarca considered whether
there was sufficient evidence that the superintendent knew of these
conditions suggests that the wiser course is to adduce some circum-
stantial evidence that the defendants' duties exposed them to infor-
mation about the conditions. LaMarca illustrates several ways to do
this. The inmates themselves could testify to the existence of these
conditions. Whether the sworn testimony of convicted criminals
alone will be enough to convince a jury is another issue, but it is
enough to create a genuine issue about the existence of the
conditions.
The fact that conditions exist, however, is material only if they
obviously place inmates at a substantial risk of serious bodily harm.
This element is the more difficult of the two to prove. Although some
courts and commentators have recognized that certain conditions cre-
ate a risk of rape, t57 there is a danger that a court in a particular case
will not accept these as evidence because they do not deal with the
specific institution involved in that particular case. The wiser course,
as illustrated in Hale, is to produce an affidavit from a qualified expert
who can testify that the conditions would make it obvious to a reasona-
ble law enforcement official that the inmates are at a substantial risk
of serious harm.
1 5 8
IV. CONCLUSION
Summary judgment is only appropriate when no reasonable trier
of fact could find for the non-moving party. Courts have sometimes
granted summary judgment to prison officials in § 1983 "failure to
protect" actions on the ground that the plaintiff-inmates could not
produce evidence sufficient to permit a trier of fact to conclude that
the defendant-officials had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of
serious harm. In Farmer v. Brennan, however, the Supreme Court rec-
155. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1583 (11th Cir. 1995); see also supra note
116 and accompanying text.
156. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 84243 (1994) (citation omitted).
157. See supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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ognized that a trier of fact may infer that prison officials knew of such
a risk if the risk was obvious. Consequently, if an inmate produces
evidence that a substantial risk of rape was obvious at an institution,
then a trier of fact could infer that the officials actually knew of the
risk and summary judgment for defendant-officials would be
inappropriate.
